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I. Introduction
The widespread adoption of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) through-
out the world is part of the global spread of “regulatory capitalism”1. The shift 
of delegation of regulatory powers from the political authorities to independent 
(or semi-independent) regulatory agencies is no longer seen as an institutional 
aspect of the governance structure of modern states2. In Europe, the imple-
mentation of this new form of public management has been described as the 
“emergence of regulatory state”3.
Morocco, which is linked to the European Union by an advanced status4, 
lives in a state of economy under liberalization. The reorientation of economic 
policy was clearly illustrated by the vast privatization program launched in 1993. 
Thus, a certain number of monopoly economic activities were withdrawn whol-
ly or in part from the fold of the public sphere, to be transferred to the private 
sphere governed by competition.
The theme of the regulatory state is henceforth inseparable from the neolib-
eral perspective, making market mechanisms the essential element of economic 
dynamics the state cannot be considered as the engine of development; and 
its bureaucratic logic is that it can only be a supervisor. The state must play the 
role of a “regulator”, in charge of ensuring the maintenance of major economic 
equilibria by integrating constraints of various kinds. The evolution of the market 
would make this intervention indispensable: the increasing complexity of the 
economic circuits, the technological changes, the globalization of exchanges, 
but also the growing pressure of economic powers whose power is reinforced 
by globalization, requires the establishment of agencies capable of setting cer-
tain rules of the game, to enhance some values and to protect certain interests.5
Some special authorities have the responsibility such as the National Tele-
communications Regulatory Agency in telecommunications, the High Authority 
of Audiovisual Communication in the audiovisual field.
The Competition Council has a more general and horizontal function of mon-
itoring the proper functioning of all markets, whether by issuing opinions or by 
sanctioning anticompetitive practices6.
1 Levi-Faur (2005).
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2016).
3 Majone (1994), p.77.
4 iván Martín (2009).
5 ChevaLLier (2004).
6 eL BazziM (2019).
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In the electricity sector, the World Bank, which has played an important role 
in the implementation of the world  bank’s transplanted “good practices”, has 
put in place a policy that subordinates its loans for the development of elec-
tricity by setting up an independent regulator. This is the case in Morocco, with 
the National Electricity Regulatory Authority (ANRE), responsible for ensuring the 
proper functioning of the electricity market under construction. 
However, when creating IRAs, politicians have delegated regulatory powers 
to agencies whose institutional design seeks to reduce political control over reg-
ulatory policy. But it is important to explain here, not why politicians delegate reg-
ulatory powers to agencies, but why they delegate to an «independent» agency7.
Regulation also implies a different relationship to the law. it would be charac-
terized by its approximation, adaptation to the context of the societies it claims 
to govern, pragmatism and flexibility.
These characteristics represent the common institutional context of what 
has been called the “regulatory states in the South”8. As a result, different factors 
may have shaped the independence levels of regulators in Morocco.
One of the main problems is the different degrees and levels of democracy 
that these countries enjoy and how this affects the practice of IRAs. In other 
words, under a hybrid regime that combines authoritarian practices and dem-
ocratic principles, should we expect to see regulatory action similar to that of 
liberal democracies? What does their independence mean in this context?
Initially, the goal was to institute a state-oriented architecture geared towards 
the search for efficiency and modernization. To achieve this goal, the IRAs have 
been put in place; yet the independence of the regulatory agencies still raises 
questions.
2. Regulatory agencies, a reconfiguration of state architecture 
in Morocco
Regulations, assumed by IRAs, represent a certain change in the tradition-
al principles governing Moroccan administrative organization. Conscious of the 
limits of regulation and command by means of the unilateral act, the public au-
thorities seem to abandon clearly the traditional methods of intervention and are 
gradually moving towards the conscious and voluntary consecration of a certain 
number of processes, most of which are quite new. It is more and more a ques-
tion of consultation, partnership, and contractual techniques.
7 GiLardi (2008).
8 duBash & MorGan (2012), p. 262.
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Arguably, the country faces incentives to grant formal independence to 
agencies in economic areas, such as financial services, since attracting large 
financial capital is a key mechanism to improve economic growth9. Delegating 
the enforcement of competition law to the Competition Council, for instance, 
represents a credible guarantee of equal treatment between national and inter-
national companies within the national market10.
Regulation leads to a correlative adaptation of the principles of state organ-
ization. The IRAs have not only been set up to regulate the economic sectors 
open to competition, but also to regulate certain sensitive sectors with regard to 
public liberties, such as the communication sector, which seems to attest that 
the logic of regulation is overflowing the goes further than the field of the market. 
The importance of their institution in terms of traditional principles of state organ-
ization cannot be underestimated. 
As such, we recognize these agencies as “new structures”, with a specific 
status very different from “conventional administrations”, or as laboratories of a 
new public law.
The diffusion of IRAs, in the Moroccan context, coincided with the democra-
tization of the country, as well as privatization and major economic reforms, the 
emergence of the new concept of authority and the will to promote the country 
by King Mohammed VI. As a matter of fact, a significant correlation between the 
levels of countries democratization, and the levels of regulators independence, 
is still a subject of research. 
As non-majoritarian institutions, the IRAs are managed by non-elected offi-
cials and are structurally detached from ministries. Moreover, their presidents are 
still appointed by the king, who enjoys broad constitutional and religious powers 
in Morocco. If in other models, parliament is involved in the nomination process, 
in Morocco, this is not always the case.
Thus, some consider that the use of the term “independent” by the consti-
tution and the legislator to distinguish and characterize these IRAs, rather sig-
nifies a certain intention of rupture and a minimum of alterations of the classical 
principles.
More broadly, the credible commitment hypothesis argues that elected offi-
cials suffer a deficit in their credibility as a result of time inconsistency in politics. 
Hence, by granting independence to IRAs, politicians tie their hands to a prede-
termined course of action, despite the rise of new majority coalitions, and thus 
gain credibility11. However, the king remains the keystone of the political system 
9 stasavaGe (2002).
10 eL BazziM (2016).
11 Levy & spiLLer (1996).
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in Morocco and ensures its continuity and controls its changes12.This hypothesis 
can be rejected.
The main key element shaping policies in the regulatory states of the South, 
like Morocco, is the pressure international actors place on developing countries 
through loan conditions and trade access agreements13.
In this regard, the World Bank’s conditionality policy is being advanced in 
favour of the restructuring of a few sectors through the adoption and trans-
plantation of a reform model through pressure on developing countries. Among 
these “models” is the establishment of independent regulators - an institutional 
arrangement that the World Bank has considered as a central reference when 
assessing institutional and regulatory reforms14.
More generally, the demands of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank for fiscal discipline, privatization and deregulation - among other 
policies known as the «Washington Consensus» - in exchange for aid, grants 
or loans - have been well studied15. Therefore, “coercive isomorphism”, in the 
words of DiMaggio and Powell16, could explain the levels of independence that 
developing governments grant when creating new regulators17.
However, the analysis of the authorities assuming the regulation indicates a 
profound renewal of the classical bases adequate to the administrative organ-
ization. The emergence of a new legal category within the state demonstrates 
how public law is a permanent construction, able to adapt to changes in insti-
tutional practice. In the Moroccan context, it is considered as a participation in 
the democratization of the administrative life, and this within the framework of a 
new phase of the evolution of the Moroccan administration, whose reform of the 
administration is returning to the top of the national agenda, which is reflected in 
reform programs focused on new values, democracy and human rights.
In the form of a reciprocal relationship, public law strives to assimilate the 
regulatory function, while the latter helps to achieve it. This is expressed in the 
requirement of independence, an essential feature of organizations in charge of 
a regulatory function. This requirement of independence characterizes in the first 
place the independent authorities.
For some authors, their function answers to distinctive principles, so that the 
creation of an independent administrative authority often leads to the removal 
12 MeLLoni (2013).
13 Braithwaite (2008).
14 Brown et al. ( 2006).
15 doBBin et al. (2007).
16 diMaGGio and poweLL (1983).
17 duBash & MorGan (2012).
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of certain functions in certain sectors from the grip of the rulers, or even to 
“depoliticize” them in a way, to entrust them to so-called neutral and impartial 
instances, in a kind of disjunction between the state-legal entity and the state 
political power.
The function of the regulation imparted to the state would therefore have led 
to a modification of the state architecture resulting in the establishment of IRAs, 
which leads us to deal with this question of independence in this third part.
3. The independence of the IRAs
The administration does not need to be independent, since all its acts lead 
to general interest. In the regulatory system, which refers to a theory of suspi-
cion, the regulator must necessarily be independent of the government and the 
operators. Indeed, these last two will always look after their particular interests 
(their own utility function).
The independence of regulators also refers to the principle of impartiality. The 
modalities of this independence present a certain heterogeneity to the extent 
that there is no common and universal institutional model, but a reconciliation of 
structures according to the legal systems. In this sense, Marie-Anne Frison-Ro-
che believes that “independence is defined as the material and psychological 
condition allowing those who benefit from it to decide impartially, that is to say 
without having to follow orders formulated by a third, or even be influenced by 
it”18. To meet this obligation, regulators must respect certain organizational and 
operational conditions.
The regulators independence is a topic of intense criticism by the legal 
doctrine dealing with this issue. However, the Moroccan constitution of 2011 is 
explicit about this question and qualifies in its Title XII “Of Good governance”, 
several institutions as “independent”. In particular, Article 162 states that “The 
Mediator is an independent and specialized national institution” and Article 166 
considers that “The Council of Competition is an independent institution”. There 
is no doubt that this constitutional consecration further legitimizes these regula-
tory structures.
Part of the doctrine would have preferred the qualifier “autonomous” instead 
of “independent”, arguing the lack of legal personality of these institutions. This 
assertion is unfounded to the extent that a majority of regulatory agencies now 
have legal personality, while still being a part of the state that cannot be reduced 
to its traditional conception.
18 Frison-roChe (2011).
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In the present French context, some authors describe them as independent 
with or without legal personality, “although independent, most regulatory agen-
cies are deprived of the moral personality, their independence to be sought not 
as we could sometimes imprudently write it in the granting of this personality if 
not in their subtraction from any hierarchical power and supervision”19.
Of course, it is not by virtue of the principle of “no hierarchy or trusteeship” 
that the independence of the IRAs can be established.
Everything happens as if the unitary model was being challenged in favour of 
a new model, of the “Polycentric” type20. 
These structures are not subject to the hierarchical power usually and le-
gitimately exercised. These structures are not subject to the hierarchical power 
usually and legitimately exercised  towards  government officials or government 
departments. Thus, they are placed outside the administrative hierarchy and are 
thus removed from the authority of ministers. The latter cannot subject them to 
any order or injunction and, consequently, no gracious appeal can be usefully 
made to the ministers against the decisions of the independent agencies.
The reduction or abolition of supervisory monitoring by central authorities, 
has allowed to the IRAs a relative freedom of action. As a result, they embody a 
new administrative form and independence implying the absence of any hierar-
chical control which sets them apart as public institutions.
In state administration, IRAs have an autonomous organization under the 
law. Nevertheless, this organizational aspect is not homogeneous and differs 
from one authority to another. Collegiality is the foundation of the organization 
of these regulatory entities, because it is strictly varied in terms of quantity and 
quality.
These agencies may thus include a number of members appointed from 
among the judiciary, the higher institutions and qualified experts in the sectors 
controlled by the regulatory bodies.
The organic independence of a regulatory authority is valid vis-à-vis the ex-
ecutive, the operators and the pressure and interest groups. We state that the 
IRAs should serve citizens with double walls, both against the pressure of in-
terest groups and of political power. Indeed, being wary of the influence of the 
executive authorities and the interest groups, the constitution and the legislator 
wished to support the personal status of the members of the regulatory agen-
cies, by endowing them with multiple guarantees of independence.
In its broadest sense, independence must exist with respect to the executive 
as well as to the parties involved. This implies the existence of protection against 
19 deLaunay (2014), p. 276.
20 ChevaLLier (1998).
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external pressures and determining whether or not there is an appearance of 
independence.
An examination of the composition of the IRAs, whether they act in the field of 
liberties or the economy, shows that most of the people in charge owe it to their 
expertise, to their supposed knowledge of the common questions to deal with.
The reasons for this choice lie in the fact that these members intervene in 
areas where there is an inadequacy of the law, its progressive development, but 
also often complex regulations.
Performing the regulatory functions, apart from partisan and political strug-
gle, is the main argument that justifies the creation of IRAs. In fact, “political 
neutrality”, “depoliticization” and “impartiality” are the reasons used to justify the 
creation of IRAs.
This argument has been presented, in some cases, in a concrete situation 
of corruption or partisan political activity, and in others as a measure to prevent 
such situations from occurring. For example, the independent agencies of the 
United States emerged because of the degree of corruption that affected the 
late nineteenth-century public bodies.
Mistrust regarding the traditional public administration explains the search 
for alternative forms of organization, far from the political struggle, but also the 
supposed will of remaining these bodies independent by these so-called “inde-
pendent” bodies.
In addition, the liberalization of markets where privatization has affected pub-
lic enterprises that provide certain services (such as telecommunications and 
energy), and which have generated new markets, had to be assigned to IRAs 
supposed to act without instructions from government authorities.
In the era of globalization, it is agreed that the regulation and control of 
certain activities should be attributed to “independent agencies”, because the 
decision-making mechanisms of the political authorities are not considered ap-
propriate for economic decision-making. In addition, some socio-economic sec-
tors remain particularly sensitive to political changes. This is why we must ensure 
the proper functioning of markets beyond the vagaries of political life.
However, it is important to remain vigilant, as IRAs can become a kind of 
“magic formula”, capable of solving the most diverse legal and political prob-
lems. Adopting a law that creates an institution labelled as “independent” is not 
enough to reduce the distance between what it’s done and what has to be done.
It is also important to stress that the question of the legitimacy of these reg-
ulatory agencies remains unresolved.
Two lines of thought allow to provide some answers to this question. The 
first, using the so-called «technocratic legitimacy», argues that the activity of the 
authorities is legitimate, because their members are specialists in the economic 
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field, and they make all the decisions regarding the market, based solely on 
technical criteria; however, while all the decisions of these regulatory agencies 
are purely technical and legal, many of them have important political significance. 
Moreover, they are not always taken based solely on technical criteria.
The second one is to compensate for the lack of democratic legitimacy of 
these agencies, by strengthening the information and transparency mecha-
nisms, in relation with the different actors of the national economy.
Legitimacy presupposes the consideration of a triple imperative in three di-
mensions. First, taking into account the plurality of expressions of the common 
good, namely the general interest. Then, the establishment of a legitimacy of 
proximity of the economic actors, which aims at the recognition of singularities. 
Finally, the legitimacy of independence and impartiality, which is based on the 
distance between the imperatives of the general interest and the particular inter-
ests. However, this last legitimacy can be sought only by means of legal norms, 
but also by a personal or collective ethics and a deontology of the members of 
these agencies. However, the boundaries between these various notions are 
permeable and evolving, as are the boundaries between the permitted, the for-
bidden and the tolerated.
4. The requirements of the rule of law means the IRAs also 
have to be accountable
Accountability is a concept that is not easy to define in a few words. Caiden 
holds that “to be accountable is to answer for one’s responsibilities, to report, to 
explain, to give reasons, to respond, to assume obligations, to render a reckon-
ing and to submit to an outside or external judgment.”21
The first control relates to IRAs activity, is assumed by the Parliament: The 
establishment of communication and control mechanisms between the Parlia-
ment and the IRAs is part of a broader phenomenon, involving the upgrading of 
the parliamentary institution22, which has been under way since the last consti-
tutional reform. The IRAs are above all created by the constitution. But it is the 
Parliament, through its legislative work, which defines the rules of form and sub-
stance of its operation. Nevertheless, the role of the parliament seems restricted 
by a decision of the Constitutional Council.
By enacting measures of collaboration and control, the constitution express-
ly sanctioned the new evaluative mission of the public policies of the Parliament 
21 Caiden (1998).
22 Bendourou (2011).
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and demanded that: “all of the institutions and instances specified in Articles 161 
to 170 of (this) Constitution must present a report on their activities, at least one 
time per year. These reports are made the object of a debate in Parliament”23. 
Thus, according to IRAs legal framework, the activity reports of every agency 
are presented to the Houses of Parliament. 
The annual report that the IRAs would be required to prepare and deliver at 
each of the two meetings embodies a form of accountability that would have 
three aspects: first, the record of the use of the resources and the exercise of the 
powers; on the other hand, the presentation of the rules of ethics implemented 
internally; and finally, the legal corpus developed and practiced by the agencies 
in the performance of their missions.
But today the assessment processes by IRAs reports are qualified mostly 
inappropriate. Because due to the length of their reports, it’s difficult to have 
tangible effects. It remains to invent a form of evaluation that is continuous, inter-
acting, which may allow some kind of modification of practices or texts. The as-
sessment will have even more impact if the regulator has the power to draw the 
conclusions, to institute a process of modification of the texts that corresponds 
to what the evaluation comes up with.
Another recommended instrument would be periodic hearings of the chair-
persons of the IRAs by the relevant parliamentary commissions. Indeed, the 
principles of good governance, the correlation between accountability and re-
sponsibility find their way into the 2011 constitution which provides that: “The 
commissions concerned within each of the two Chambers can demand to hear 
the responsible [persons] of the administrations and of the public establishments 
and enterprises, in the presence of and under the responsibility of the ministers 
concerned.”24
On the basis of these principles, the House of Representatives inserted in its 
draft rules of procedure the right of its Committee on Justice, Law and Human 
Rights to hear the heads of the IRAs mentioned in the Constitution, taking into 
account institutions and bodies for the protection of rights and freedoms, good 
governance, human and sustainable development and participatory democra-
cy, mentioned in articles 161 to 170 of the constitutional text25. However, the 
23 Morocco’s Constitution of 2011, Article 160.
24 Morocco’s Constitution of 2011, Article 102.
25 These IRAs are ten in number and are grouped under the constitution in into three major categories: 
“the instances protecting and promoting Human rights” including: the National Council for Human Rights, 
the Mediator, the Council of the Moroccan community abroad, and the authority charged with
parity and with the struggle against all forms of discrimination.
“The Instances of Good Governance and of Regulation”: The High Authority of Broadcasting, the Compe-
tition Council, The National Instance of Probity, of the Prevention and of the Struggle Against Corruption.
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constitutional court stated that these agencies are considered by the organic 
Law as independent bodies and not as public administrations, institutions or 
enterprises. They are therefore not subject to the authority or the guardianship 
of a particular minister26. 
In addition, the legislature adopts statutes relating to their status and oper-
ation and the budget devoted to them. Thus, the decision of the Constitutional 
Council does not go in the direction of the reinforcement of the parliamentary 
control and of the principle posed by the constitution, linking the responsibility 
and the rendering of the accounts.
The second control of the activity of the IRAs relates to its budget: how they 
can use their allocated funds, administrative budgetary procedures and rules. 
The control is operated by the court of auditors: the legislator responsible for 
defining the  exercice modalities of IRAs functions, intended to provide them with 
sufficient financial resources. 
Indeed, the possibility of obtaining own resources, designated by some of 
the doctrine as the “most radical figure” of financial autonomy27, caused the 
agencies to be granted legal personality, which help them by this legal tech-
nique, not to rely only on State budget, without going so far as to finance own 
resources derived from royalties collected. 
Regarding the judicial oversight of the IRAs, the need to further increase 
the specialized knowledge and expertise of the judges, and the slowness of the 
judicial process, are the two major challenges that should be addressed.
5. Conclusion
The desire to create an «independent» regulatory agency with all the neces-
sary guarantees and means is not enough, since independence is acquired, not 
given. In the exercise of power, the degree of independence can be measured.
From a practical point of view, it is doubtful that the Moroccan State still has 
a regulatory capacity. It is indeed deprived of the indispensable means of action 
on an economy whose equilibrium depends on much more general data, given 
the globalization of trade.
“The Instances of Promotion of Human and Lasting Development and of Participative Democracy”: The 
Superior Council of Education, of Attainment of Knowledge and of Scientific Research, The Consultative 
Council of the Family and of Childhood and The Consultative Council of Youth and of Associative Action.
26 Decision of the Constitutional Council no. 924/13 of August 22, 2013 on the constitutionality of the 
rules of procedure of the House of Representatives, published in the Official Bulletin no. 6185 of September 
09, 2013 (Arabic version).
27 Frison-roChe (2006).
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No doubt, the market cannot be “self-regulated”, especially since the state 
is now supplanted in its regulatory role by other regulators – at the international 
level (e.g.,the World Trade Organization).
On the internal level too, other actors and other forms of regulation exist, 
which complement, imbricate or even substitute State regulation; we find trade 
orders, professional associations...
State regulation contains several superimposed and nested levels, whose 
coherence is random; and the state is just as regulated as it is regulator.
Finally, even if the independent agencies are increasing and their regulatory 
function is privileged especially after the 2011 constitution, this does not mean 
that the architecture of the state can be conceived on this model. Not only can 
the formula be often unsuitable for the management of concrete activities, but 
the banalization and the diversification process of those agencies in progress 
bears witness to a rapprochement with the traditional administrative forms.
Bibliography
Bendourou, Omar (2012) “ La nouvelle Constitution marocaine du 29 juillet 2011 ”, 
Revue française de droit constitutionnel, Vol. 3, n.° 91, 511-535.
Braithwaite, John (2008) Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making 
it Work Better, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Brown, Ashley C., stern, Jon, tenenBauM, Bernard W., GenCer, Defne (2006) 
Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, Washington, 
DC: WorldBank Publications.
Caiden, Gerald (1998) “The Problem of Ensuring the Accountability of Public Offi-
cials”, J. G. Jabbra and O. P. Dwevidi (eds.) Public Service Accountability: A 
Comparative, Perspective, Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
ChevaLLier, Jacques (1998) “ Régulation et polycentrisme dans l’administration 
française ”, La Revue administrative, n.° 301, 43-53.
ChevaLLier, Jacques (2004) “L’état régulateur”, Revue française d’administration 
publique, n.° 111, 473-482.
deLaunay, Benoît (2014) “ Autorités de régulation et responsabilité de la puis-
sance publique”, Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France 
et à l’Étranger, n.° 2, 276.
doBBin, Frank, siMMons, Beth, Garrett, Geoffrey (2007) “The Global Diffusion of 
Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?” 
Annual Review of Sociology, no. 33, 449-472.
duBash, Navroz K., MorGan, Bronwen (2012) “Understanding the Rise of the 
Regulatory State of the South”, Regulation & Governance, no. 6, 261-281.
43VOLUME IV \ n.º 1 \ janeiro 2020 \ 31-43
Reinventing the Moroccan state and the implementation of the independent 
regulatory agencies (IRAs) \ Rachid El Bazzim
eL BazziM, Rachid (2016) “The Morocan Competition Council”, International Busi-
ness Law Journal, 73-81.
eL BazziM, Rachid (2019) Conseil de la concurrence au Maroc, De la recherche 
de l’indépendance à la régulation du marché, Paris: l’Harmattan.
Frison-roChe, Marie Anne (2006) “ Étude dressant le bilan des AAI ”, GeLard Pa-
trice (ed) Rapport sur les AAI, Tome II, Office parlementaire d’évaluation de 
la législation, AN n.º 3166, S. n.º 404,10.
Frison-roChe, Marie Anne (2011) Les 100 mots de la régulation. Paris cedex 14, 
France : Presses Universitaires de France.
GiLardi, Fabrizio (2008) Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regula-
tory Agencies in Western Europe, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Levi-Faur, David (2005) “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism”, The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 598, 
12-32.
Levy, Brian, spiLLer, Pablo T. (1996) Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: 
Comparative Studies of Telecommunications, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Majone, Giandomenico (1994) “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe”, 
West European Politics, no. 17, 77-101.
Martín, Iván (2009) “EU–Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the ‘Advanced 
Status’?”, Méditerrané Politics, Vol. 14, 239-245.
MeLLoni, David (2013) “ La Constitution marocaine de 2011 : une mutation des 
ordres politique et juridique marocains ”, Pouvoirs, n.° 145(2), 5-17.
MoroCCo’s Constitution oF 2011 (enGLish unoFFiCiaL transLation), <https://www.
constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf>.
oeCd (2016), Being an Independent Regulator, Paris: OECD Publications.
stasavaGe, David (2002) “Private Investment and Political Institutions”, Econom-
ics and Politics, no. 14, 41-63.
